In The Future Many Large Corporations Will Be Wiped Out And Millions Of Jobs Will Be Lost

Though corporate profits are high, & the stock market is booming, most Americans are not sharing in the economic recovery. While the top 0.1% of income recipients reap almost all the income gains, good jobs keep disappearing, and new ones tend khổng lồ be insecure and underpaid.

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One of the major causes: Instead of investing their profits in growth opportunities, corporations are using them for stock repurchases. Take the 449 firms in the S&P 500 that were publicly listed from 2003 through 2012. During that period, they used 54% of their earnings—a total of $2.4 trillion—to buy back their own stock. Dividends absorbed an extra 37% of their earnings. That left little to fund productive capabilities or better incomes for workers.

Why are such massive resources dedicated lớn stock buybacks? Because stock-based instruments ảo diệu the majority of executives’ pay, và buybacks drive up short-term stock prices. Buybacks contribute to runaway executive compensation & economic inequality in a major way. Because they extract value rather than create it, their overuse undermines the economy’s health. To lớn restore true prosperity to lớn the country, government and business leaders must take steps lớn rein them in.

Stock buybacks manipulate the market and leave most Americans worse off.

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Five years after the official kết thúc of the Great Recession, corporate profits are high, & the stock market is booming. Yet most Americans are not sharing in the recovery. While the top 0.1% of income recipients—which include most of the highest-ranking corporate executives—reap almost all the income gains, good jobs keep disappearing, và new employment opportunities tend khổng lồ be insecure & underpaid. Corporate profitability is not translating into widespread economic prosperity.

The allocation of corporate profits lớn stock buybacks deserves much of the blame. Consider the 449 companies in the S&P 500 index that were publicly listed from 2003 through 2012. During that period those companies used 54% of their earnings—a total of $2.4 trillion—to buy back their own stock, almost all through purchases on the mở cửa market. Dividends absorbed an additional 37% of their earnings. That left very little for investments in productive capabilities or higher incomes for employees.

The buyback wave has gotten so big, in fact, that even shareholders—the presumed beneficiaries of all this corporate largesse—are getting worried. “It concerns us that, in the wake of the financial crisis, many companies have shied away from investing in the future growth of their companies,” Laurence Fink, the chairman and CEO of Black
Rock, the world’s largest asset manager, wrote in an xuất hiện letter to lớn corporate America in March. “Too many companies have cut capital expenditure và even increased debt khổng lồ boost dividends and increase nói qua buybacks.”

Why are such massive resources being devoted lớn stock repurchases? Corporate executives give several reasons, which I will discuss later. But none of them has close lớn the explanatory power of this simple truth: Stock-based instruments hóa trang the majority of their pay, & in the short term buybacks drive up stock prices. In 2012 the 500 highest-paid executives named in proxy statements of U.S. Public companies received, on average, $30.3 million each; 42% of their compensation came from stock options and 41% from stock awards. By increasing the demand for a company’s shares, open-market buybacks automatically lift its stock price, even if only temporarily, & can enable the company to hit quarterly earnings per mô tả (EPS) targets.

As a result, the very people we rely on lớn make investments in the productive capabilities that will increase our shared prosperity are instead devoting most of their companies’ profits to uses that will increase their own prosperity—with unsurprising results. Even when adjusted for inflation, the compensation of đứng top U.S. Executives has doubled or tripled since the first half of the 1990s, when it was already widely viewed as excessive. Meanwhile, overall U.S. Economic performance has faltered.

If the U.S. Is to achieve growth that distributes income equitably và provides stable employment, government and business leaders must take steps khổng lồ bring both stock buybacks & executive pay under control. The nation’s economic health depends on it.

From Value Creation khổng lồ Value Extraction

For three decades I’ve been studying how the resource allocation decisions of major U.S. Corporations influence the relationship between value creation & value extraction, and how that relationship affects the U.S. Economy. From the over of World War II until the late 1970s, a retain-and-reinvest approach to lớn resource allocation prevailed at major U.S. Corporations. They retained earnings và reinvested them in increasing their capabilities, first và foremost in the employees who helped make firms more competitive. They provided workers with higher incomes và greater job security, thus contributing khổng lồ equitable, stable economic growth—what I điện thoại tư vấn “sustainable prosperity.”

This pattern began to lớn break down in the late 1970s, giving way khổng lồ a downsize-and-distribute regime of reducing costs và then distributing the freed-up cash khổng lồ financial interests, particularly shareholders. By favoring value extraction over value creation, this approach has contributed to employment instability and income inequality.

As documented by the economists Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, the richest 0.1% of U.S. Households collected a record 12.3% of all U.S. Income in 2007, surpassing their 11.5% cốt truyện in 1928, on the eve of the Great Depression. In the financial crisis of 2008–2009, their share fell sharply, but it has since rebounded, hitting 11.3% in 2012.

Since the late 1980s, the largest component of the income of the vị trí cao nhất 0.1% has been compensation, driven by stock-based pay. Meanwhile, the growth of workers’ wages has been slow and sporadic, except during the internet boom of 1998–2000, the only time in the past 46 years when real wages rose by 2% or more for three years running. Since the late 1970s, average growth in real wages has increasingly lagged productivity growth. (See the exhibit “When Productivity and Wages Parted Ways.”)

When Productivity and Wages Parted Ways

From 1948 lớn the mid-1970s, increases in productivity & wages went hand in hand. Then a gap opened between the two.

Source: econdataus.com/wagegap12.html

Not coincidentally, U.S. Employment relations have undergone a transformation in the past three decades. Mass plant closings eliminated millions of unionized blue-collar jobs. The norm of a white-collar worker’s spending his or her entire career with one company disappeared. & the seismic shift toward offshoring left all members of the U.S. Labor force—even those with advanced education and substantial work experience—vulnerable khổng lồ displacement.

To some extent these structural changes could be justified initially as necessary responses lớn changes in technology và competition. In the early 1980s permanent plant closings were triggered by the inroads superior Japanese manufacturers had made in consumer-durable & capital-goods industries. In the early 1990s one-company careers fell by the wayside in the IT sector because the open-systems architecture of the microelectronics revolution devalued the skills of older employees versed in proprietary technologies. Và in the early 2000s the offshoring of more-routine tasks, such as writing unsophisticated software and manning customer hotline centers, sped up as a capable labor force emerged in low-wage developing economies và communications costs plunged, allowing U.S. Companies lớn focus their domestic employees on higher-value-added work.

These practices chipped away at the loyalty and dampened the spending power of American workers, & often gave away key competitive capabilities of U.S. Companies. Attracted by the quick financial gains they produced, many executives ignored the long-term effects và kept pursuing them well past the time they could be justified.

A turning point was the wave of hostile takeovers that swept the country in the 1980s. Corporate raiders often claimed that the complacent leaders of the targeted companies were failing khổng lồ maximize returns to lớn shareholders. That criticism prompted boards of directors to lớn try to align the interests of management and shareholders by making stock-based pay a much bigger component of executive compensation.

Given incentives to maximize shareholder value và meet Wall Street’s expectations for ever higher quarterly EPS, đứng top executives turned lớn massive stock repurchases, which helped them “manage” stock prices. The result: Trillions of dollars that could have been spent on innovation và job creation in the U.S. Economy over the past three decades have instead been used to lớn buy back shares for what is effectively stock-price manipulation.

Good Buybacks & Bad

Not all buybacks undermine shared prosperity. There are two major types: tender offers & open-market repurchases. With the former, a company contacts shareholders and offers to buy back their shares at a stipulated price by a certain near-term date, và then shareholders who find the price agreeable tender their shares to lớn the company. Tender offers can be a way for executives who have substantial ownership stakes và care about a company’s long-term competitiveness lớn take advantage of a low stock price và concentrate ownership in their own hands. This can, among other things, free them from Wall Street’s pressure khổng lồ maximize short-term profits & allow them to invest in the business. Henry Singleton was known for using tender offers in this way at Teledyne in the 1970s, và Warren Buffett for using them at GEICO in the 1980s. (GEICO became wholly owned by Buffett’s holding company, Berkshire Hathaway, in 1996.) As Buffett has noted, this kind of tender offer should be made when the share price is below the intrinsic value of the productive capabilities of the company và the company is profitable enough khổng lồ repurchase the shares without impeding its real investment plans.

But tender offers constitute only a small portion of modern buybacks. Most are now done on the open market, và my research shows that they often come at the expense of investment in productive capabilities and, consequently, aren’t great for long-term shareholders.

Companies have been allowed lớn repurchase their shares on the xuất hiện market with virtually no regulatory limits since 1982, when the SEC instituted Rule 10b-18 of the Securities Exchange Act. Under the rule, a corporation’s board of directors can authorize senior executives to lớn repurchase up khổng lồ a certain dollar amount of stock over a specified or open-ended period of time, và the company must publicly announce the buyback program. After that, management can buy a large number of the company’s shares on any given business day without fear that the SEC will charge it with stock-price manipulation—provided, among other things, that the amount does not exceed a “safe harbor” of 25% of the previous four weeks’ average daily trading volume. The SEC requires companies to lớn report total quarterly repurchases but not daily ones, meaning that it cannot determine whether a company has breached the 25% limit without a special investigation.

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Economics Feature Gautam Mukunda
The financialization of the economy has serious downsides.

Despite the escalation in buybacks over the past three decades, the SEC has only rarely launched proceedings against a company for using them to manipulate its stock price. Và even within the 25% limit, companies can still make huge purchases: Exxon Mobil, by far the biggest stock repurchaser from 2003 lớn 2012, can buy back about $300 million worth of shares a day, và Apple up to lớn $1.5 billion a day. In essence, Rule 10b-18 legalized stock market manipulation through open-market repurchases.

The rule was a major departure from the agency’s original mandate, laid out in the Securities Exchange Act in 1934. The act was a reaction to a host of unscrupulous activities that had fueled speculation in the Roaring ’20s, leading to the stock market crash of 1929 & the Great Depression. To prevent such shenanigans, the act gave the SEC broad powers to issue rules & regulations.

During the Reagan years, the SEC began lớn roll back those rules. The commission’s chairman from 1981 lớn 1987 was John Shad, a former vice chairman of E.F. Hutton & the first Wall Street insider khổng lồ lead the commission in 50 years. He believed that the deregulation of securities markets would channel savings into economic investments more efficiently & that the isolated cases of fraud & manipulation that might go undetected did not justify onerous disclosure requirements for companies. The SEC’s adoption of Rule 10b-18 reflected that point of view.

Debunking the Justifications for Buybacks

Executives give three main justifications for open-market repurchases. Let’s examine them one by one:

1. Buybacks are investments in our undervalued shares that signal our confidence in the company’s future.

This makes some sense. But the reality is that over the past two decades major U.S. Companies have tended to do buybacks in bull markets and cut back on them, often sharply, in bear markets. (See the exhibit “Where Did the Money from Productivity Increases Go?”) They buy high and, if they sell at all, sell low. Research by the Academic-Industry Research Network, a nonprofit I cofounded & lead, shows that companies that bởi buybacks never resell the shares at higher prices.

Where Did the Money from Productivity Increases Go?

Buybacks—as well as dividends—have skyrocketed in the past 20 years. (Note that these data are for the 251 companies that were in the S&P 500 in January 2013 & were public from 1981 through 2012. Inclusion of firms that went public after 1981, such as Microsoft, Cisco, Amgen, Oracle, & Dell, would make the increase in buybacks even more marked.) Though executives say they repurchase only undervalued stocks, buybacks increased when the stock market boomed, casting doubt on that claim.

Source: Standard và Poor’s Compustat database; the Academic-Industry Research Network. Note: Mean repurchase và dividend amounts are in 2012 dollars.

Once in a while a company that bought high in a boom has been forced to sell low in a bust lớn alleviate financial distress. GE, for example, spent $3.2 billion on buybacks in the first three quarters of 2008, paying an average price of $31.84 per share. Then, in the last quarter, as the financial crisis brought about losses at GE Capital, the company did a $12 billion stock issue at an average share price of $22.25, in a failed attempt to protect its triple-A credit rating.

In general, when a company buys back shares at what turn out lớn be high prices, it eventually reduces the value of the stock held by continuing shareholders. “The continuing shareholder is penalized by repurchases above intrinsic value,” Warren Buffett wrote in his 1999 letter lớn Berkshire Hathaway shareholders. “Buying dollar bills for $1.10 is not good business for those who stick around.”

2. Buybacks are necessary to lớn offset the dilution of earnings per mô tả when employees exercise stock options.

Calculations that I have done for high-tech companies with broad-based stock option programs reveal that the volume of open-market repurchases is generally a multiple of the volume of options that employees exercise. In any case, there’s no logical economic rationale for doing repurchases khổng lồ offset dilution from the exercise of employee stock options. Options are meant khổng lồ motivate employees to lớn work harder now lớn produce higher future returns for the company. Therefore, rather than using corporate cash to boost EPS immediately, executives should be willing to wait for the incentive khổng lồ work. If the company generates higher earnings, employees can exercise their options at higher stock prices, và the company can allocate the increased earnings khổng lồ investment in the next round of innovation.

3. Our company is mature and has run out of profitable investment opportunities; therefore, we should return its unneeded cash to lớn shareholders.

Some people used lớn argue that buybacks were a more tax-efficient means of distributing money khổng lồ shareholders than dividends. But that has not been the case since 2003, when the tax rates on long-term capital gains và qualified dividends were made the same. Much more important issues remain, however: What is the CEO’s main role and his or her responsibility to shareholders?

Companies that have built up productive capabilities over long periods typically have huge organizational & financial advantages when they enter related markets. One of the chief functions of đứng top executives is to discover new opportunities for those capabilities. When they opt to vày large open-market repurchases instead, it raises the question of whether these executives are doing their jobs.

A related issue is the notion that the CEO’s main obligation is lớn shareholders. It’s based on a misconception of the shareholders’ role in the modern corporation. The philosophical justification for giving them all excess corporate profits is that they are best positioned lớn allocate resources because they have the most interest in ensuring that capital generates the highest returns. This proposition is central khổng lồ the “maximizing shareholder value” (MSV) arguments espoused over the years, most notably by Michael C. Jensen. The MSV school also posits that companies’ so-called free cash flow should be distributed lớn shareholders because only they make investments without a guaranteed return—and hence bear risk.

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Why Money for Reinvestment Has Dried Up

Since the early 1980s, when restrictions on open-market buybacks were greatly eased, distributions to shareholders have absorbed a huge portion of net income, leaving much less for reinvestment in companies.

Note: Data are for the 251 companies that were in the S&P 500 Index in January 2013 & were publicly listed from 1981 through 2012. If the companies that went public after 1981, such as Microsoft, Cisco, Amgen, Oracle, và Dell, were included, repurchases as a percentage of net income would be even higher.

But the MSV school ignores other participants in the economy who bear risk by investing without a guaranteed return. Taxpayers take on such risk through government agencies that invest in infrastructure and knowledge creation. Và workers take it on by investing in the development of their capabilities at the firms that employ them. As risk bearers, taxpayers, whose dollars tư vấn business enterprises, và workers, whose efforts generate productivity improvements, have claims on profits that are at least as strong as the shareholders’.

The irony of MSV is that public-company shareholders typically never invest in the value-creating capabilities of the company at all. Rather, they invest in outstanding shares in the hope that the stock price will rise. And a prime way in which corporate executives fuel that hope is by doing buybacks to manipulate the market. The only money that táo ever raised from public shareholders was $97 million at its IPO in 1980. Yet in recent years, hedge fund activists such as David Einhorn and Carl Icahn—who played absolutely no role in the company’s success over the decades—have purchased large amounts of táo bị cắn stock & then pressured the company to lớn announce some of the largest buyback programs in history.

The past decade’s huge increase in repurchases, in addition lớn high levels of dividends, have come at a time when U.S. Industrial companies face new competitive challenges. This raises questions about how much of corporate cash flow is really “free” khổng lồ be distributed to shareholders. Many academics—for example, Gary phường Pisano và Willy C. Shih of Harvard Business School, in their 2009 HBR article “Restoring American Competitiveness” and their book Producing Prosperity—have warned that if U.S. Companies don’t start investing much more in research and manufacturing capabilities, they cannot expect to lớn remain competitive in a range of advanced công nghệ industries.

Retained earnings have always been the foundation for investments in innovation. Executives who subscribe lớn MSV are thus copping out of their responsibility khổng lồ invest broadly & deeply in the productive capabilities their organizations need to lớn continually innovate. MSV as commonly understood is a theory of value extraction, not value creation.

Executives Are Serving Their Own Interests

As I noted earlier, there is a simple, much more plausible explanation for the increase in open-market repurchases: the rise of stock-based pay. Combined with pressure from Wall Street, stock-based incentives make senior executives extremely motivated to bởi vì buybacks on a colossal and systemic scale.

Consider the 10 largest repurchasers, which spent a combined $859 billion on buybacks, an amount equal khổng lồ 68% of their combined net income, from 2003 through 2012. (See the exhibit “The vị trí cao nhất 10 Stock Repurchasers.”) During the same decade, their CEOs received, on average, a total of $168 million each in compensation. On average, 34% of their compensation was in the size of stock options & 24% in stock awards. At these companies the next four highest-paid senior executives each received, on average, $77 million in compensation during the 10 years—27% of it in stock options & 29% in stock awards. Yet since 2003 only three of the 10 largest repurchasers—Exxon Mobil, IBM, và Procter & Gamble—have outperformed the S&P 500 Index.

The vị trí cao nhất 10 Stock Repurchasers 2003–2012

At most of the leading U.S. Companies below, distributions lớn shareholders were well in excess of net income. These distributions came at great cost to lớn innovation, employment, and—in cases such as oil refining và pharmaceuticals—customers who had to pay higher prices for products.

Sources: Standard & Poor’s Compustat database; Standard và Poor’s Execucomp database; the Academic-Industry Research Network. Note: The percentages of stock-based pay include gains realized from exercising stock options for all years plus, for 2003–2005, the fair value of restricted stock grants or, for 2006–2012, gains realized on vesting of stock awards. Rounding lớn the nearest billion may affect total distributions và percentages of net income. *Steven Ballmer, Microsoft’s CEO from January 2000 to February 2014, did not receive any stock-based pay. He does, however, own about 4% of Microsoft’s shares, valued at more than $13 billion.

Reforming the System

Buybacks have become an unhealthy corporate obsession. Shifting corporations back to lớn a retain-and-reinvest regime that promotes stable & equitable growth will take bold action. Here are three proposals:

Put an end to open-market buybacks.

In a 2003 update khổng lồ Rule 10b-18, the SEC explained: “It is not appropriate for the safe harbor to lớn be available when the issuer has a heightened incentive to manipulate its tóm tắt price.” In practice, though, the stock-based pay of the executives who decide to bởi vì repurchases provides just this “heightened incentive.” to lớn correct this glaring problem, the SEC should rescind the safe harbor.

A good first step toward that goal would be an extensive SEC study of the possible damage that open-market repurchases have done lớn capital formation, industrial corporations, & the U.S. Economy over the past three decades. For example, during that period the amount of stock taken out of the market has exceeded the amount issued in almost every year; from 2004 through 2013 this net withdrawal averaged $316 billion a year. In aggregate, the stock market is not functioning as a source of funds for corporate investment. As I’ve already noted, retained earnings have always provided the base for such investment. I believe that the practice of tying executive compensation lớn stock price is undermining the formation of physical and human capital.

Rein in stock-based pay.

Many studies have shown that large companies tend to lớn use the same mix of consultants khổng lồ benchmark executive compensation, and that each consultant recommends that the client pay its CEO well above average. As a result, compensation inevitably ratchets up over time. The studies also show that even declines in stock price increase executive pay: When a company’s stock price falls, the board stuffs even more options & stock awards into top executives’ packages, claiming that it must ensure that they won’t jump ship và will vị whatever is necessary to get the stock price back up.

In 1991 the SEC began allowing vị trí cao nhất executives to keep the gains from immediately selling stock acquired from options. Previously, they had lớn hold the stock for six months or give up any “short-swing” gains. That decision has only served khổng lồ reinforce top executives’ overriding personal interest in boosting stock prices. & because corporations aren’t required to lớn disclose daily buyback activity, it gives executives the opportunity to trade, undetected, on inside information about when buybacks are being done. At the very least, the SEC should stop allowing executives to lớn sell stock immediately after options are exercised. Such a rule could help launch a much-needed discussion of meaningful reform that goes beyond the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act’s “Say on Pay”—an ineffectual law that gives shareholders the right to make nonbinding recommendations lớn the board on compensation issues.

But overall the use of stock-based pay should be severely limited. Incentive compensation should be subject lớn performance criteria that reflect investment in innovative capabilities, not stock performance.

Transform the boards that determine executive compensation.

Boards are currently dominated by other CEOs, who have a strong bias toward ratifying higher pay packages for their peers. When approving enormous distributions lớn shareholders & stock-based pay for đứng top executives, these directors believe they’re acting in the interests of shareholders.

Courage in Washington

After the Harvard Law School dean Erwin Griswold published “Are Stock Options Getting out of Hand?” in this magazine in 1960, Senator Albert Gore launched a chiến dịch that persuaded Congress to whittle away special tax advantages for executive stock options. After the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the compensation expert Graef Crystal declared that stock options that qualified for the capital-gains tax rate, “once the most popular of all executive compensation devices…have been given the last rites by Congress.” It also happens that during the 1970s the chia sẻ of all U.S. Income that the đứng top 0.1% of households got was at its lowest point in the past century.

The members of the U.S. Congress should show the courage & independence of their predecessors & go beyond “Say on Pay” to vì something about excessive executive compensation. In addition, Congress should fix a broken tax regime that frequently rewards value extractors as if they were value creators & ignores the critical role of government investment in the infrastructure và knowledge that are so crucial khổng lồ the competitiveness of U.S. Business.

Instead, what we have now are corporations that lobby—often successfully—for federal subsidies for research, development, and exploration, while devoting far greater resources khổng lồ stock buybacks. Here are three examples of such hypocrisy:

Alternative energy.

Exxon Mobil, while receiving about $600 million a year in U.S. Government subsidies for oil exploration (according to lớn the Center for American Progress), spends about $21 billion a year on buybacks. It spends virtually no money on alternative energy research.

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Meanwhile, through the American Energy Innovation Council, đứng top executives of Microsoft, GE, và other companies have lobbied the U.S. Government khổng lồ triple its investment in alternative energy research và subsidies, to lớn $16 billion a year. Yet these companies had plenty of funds they could have invested in alternative energy on their own. Over the past decade Microsoft and GE, combined, have spent about that amount annually on buybacks.

Nanotechnology.

Intel executives have long lobbied the U.S. Government to lớn increase spending on nanotechnology research. In 2005, Intel’s then-CEO, Craig R. Barrett, argued that “it will take a massive, coordinated U.S. Research effort involving academia, industry, & state & federal governments to lớn ensure that America continues khổng lồ be the world leader in information technology.” Yet from 2001, when the U.S. Government launched the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), through 2013 Intel’s expenditures on buybacks were almost four times the total NNI budget.

Pharmaceutical drugs.

In response khổng lồ complaints that U.S. Drug prices are at least twice those in any other country, Pfizer & other U.S. Pharmaceutical companies have argued that the profits from these high prices—enabled by a generous intellectual-property regime và lax price regulation—permit more R&D to be done in the United States than elsewhere. Yet from 2003 through 2012, Pfizer funneled an amount equal to lớn 71% of its profits into buybacks, & an amount equal khổng lồ 75% of its profits into dividends. In other words, it spent more on buybacks & dividends than it earned và tapped its capital reserves khổng lồ help fund them. The reality is, Americans pay high drug prices so that major pharmaceutical companies can boost their stock prices & pad executive pay.Given the importance of the stock market & corporations to lớn the economy và society, U.S. Regulators must step in to check the behavior of those who are unable or unwilling to control themselves. “The mission of the U.S. Securities và Exchange Commission,” the SEC’s trang web explains, “is lớn protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, & efficient markets, và facilitate capital formation.” Yet, as we have seen, in its rulings on và monitoring of stock buybacks và executive pay over three decades, the SEC has taken a course of action contrary to those objectives. It has enabled the wealthiest 0.1% of society, including top executives, to capture the lion’s giới thiệu of the gains of U.S. Productivity growth while the vast majority of Americans have been left behind. Rule 10b-18, in particular, has facilitated a rigged stock market that, by permitting the massive distribution of corporate cash khổng lồ shareholders, has undermined capital formation, including human capital formation.

The corporate resource allocation process is America’s source of economic security or insecurity, as the case may be. If Americans want an economy in which corporate profits result in shared prosperity, the buyback và executive compensation binges will have khổng lồ end. As with any addiction, there will be withdrawal pains. But the best executives may actually get satisfaction out of being paid a reasonable salary for allocating resources in ways that sustain the enterprise, provide higher standards of living to the workers who make it succeed, and generate tax revenues for the governments that provide it with crucial inputs.

Câu hỏi:

In the future many large corporations will be wiped out và millions of people will be out of work.

corporation (n): công ty, tập đoàn

Dịch nghĩa các đáp án:

A. Service (n): dịch vụ

B. Company (n): công ty

C. Supermarket (n): khôn cùng thị

D. Farm (n): nông trại

=> corporation = company

Tạm dịch: về sau nhiều công ty lớn sẽ vỡ nợ và các người có khả năng sẽ bị thất nghiệp.

Đáp án: B

Toán 12

Lý thuyết Toán 12

Giải bài tập SGK Toán 12

Giải BT sách nâng cao Toán 12

Trắc nghiệm Toán 12

Ôn tập Toán 12 Chương 4

Ngữ văn 12

Lý thuyết Ngữ Văn 12

Soạn văn 12

Soạn văn 12 (ngắn gọn)

Văn chủng loại 12

Hồn Trương Ba, da hàng thịt

Tiếng Anh 12

Giải bài bác Tiếng Anh 12

Giải bài bác Tiếng Anh 12 (Mới)

Trắc nghiệm giờ đồng hồ Anh 12

Unit 16 Lớp 12

Tiếng Anh 12 mới đánh giá 4

Vật lý 12

Lý thuyết vật dụng Lý 12

Giải bài bác tập SGK thiết bị Lý 12

Giải BT sách nâng cấp Vật Lý 12

Trắc nghiệm vật Lý 12

Vật lý 12 Chương 8

Hoá học tập 12

Lý thuyết Hóa 12

Giải bài xích tập SGK Hóa 12

Giải BT sách nâng cao Hóa 12

Trắc nghiệm Hóa 12

Ôn tập hóa học 12 Chương 9

Sinh học 12

Lý thuyết Sinh 12

Giải bài tập SGK Sinh 12

Giải BT sách cải thiện Sinh 12

Trắc nghiệm Sinh 12

Ôn tập Sinh 12 Chương 8 + 9 + 10

Lịch sử 12

Lý thuyết lịch sử vẻ vang 12

Giải bài tập SGK lịch sử dân tộc 12

Trắc nghiệm lịch sử 12

Lịch Sử 12 Chương 5 lịch sử hào hùng VN

Địa lý 12

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